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A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO
THE “RELIGION – NATIONAL MYTHOLOGY”
SYNTHESIS
Summary: The paper analyses the philosophical aspects of the “religion –
national mythology” synthesis. The main directions of the study are as follows:
1.Both on the individual and social plan, the orientation of the transcending, univer-
salizing power of religion could vary depending on the macro-social movements a
community /or an individual/ is involved in . For the individual as for the community,
religion could be a cultural position transcending ego- and ethno-centrism,
mono-cultural tendencies; in situations of internal differentiation and disintegration
of these entities, the universalizing, binding role of religion is partialized and deter-
mined by various social groups, who are often in opposition to each other due to their
economic, political, ethnic, psychological features; 2. This process is usually related
to the invalidation of universally uniting religious-moral bonds and values and inten-
sification of differences: power, property, doctrinal differences; to a shift of the
weight center from internal spiritual movements /particularly typical of mysticism,
asceticism, priesthood/ on to practical social action – reformist heresies, the various
practical theologies of revolution, liberation, the religious-motivated wars; 3. When
reduced to an ethnic, political, or state emblem, religious affiliation to Judaism, Is-
lam, Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism has become and still remain a tool for
the sacralization of military and political conflicts. In religion-motivated conflict sit-
uations, opposing parties de-sacralize their Sacred Books as their acts contradict the
books’moral content; 4.The power of historical mythologies is in reverse proportion
to the capacity of a nation to periodically renew its social life world – its psychologi-
cal attitudes, labour relations, political stereotypes; 5.In this type of situation, reli-
gion is usually reduced to “belonging”, as G.Davie put it, at the expense of “believ-
ing” and a corresponding moral behavior. The religious universe becomes thus
subordinated to partial group values, instead of standing above them.
Key words: religion, nation, mythology, instrumentalization, mission.
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1. A methodological problem
The view that religion is of an ambivalent nature, that it has a
double cultural existence, that the feelings connected with religious
experience are correspondingly ambivalent, is shared by certain
classic, modern, and post-modern thinkers, like Schleiermacher,
Kant, the early Hegel, Henri Bergson, Kierkegaard, Tillich, Fromm,
etc. These authors have referred to two kinds of religion, each of
which has a separate definition: traditional, authoritarian, communal
on the one hand, and personal, exalted, mystical on the other. The
two types also have different bearers: the people, the group, the com-
munity for the first, and the religious virtuoso, the person with an
“ear” for religion, the Romantic, the mystic for the latter. Each type
is related to a predominant type of experience and satisfies specific
needs. The first type of religion, according to these authors, is con-
nected with negative emotions and illusory means of overcoming
them: the feeling of fear, dependence, limitation, subordination, and
submission. The second type is connected with positive emotions:
love, freedom, faith in one’s own force. The first type corresponds to
bureaucratic ecclesiastic institutions, to a system of dogma, and ritu-
alized collective action; the second, to ecstasy and spiritual enthusi-
asm, to vibrant and captivating prophetic speech.
The deepest philosophical premises for this view of religion
in terms of ambivalent cultural opposition, are certain fundamental
anthropological antinomies that problematize the conditions and
emergence of human nature and vitality: essence and existence, the
individual and the social aspects, the creative and the routine aspects
of human life, authoritarianism and freedom.
Unfortunately the term “religion” is often employed without
preliminary discussion of the contents of religiousness and without
the necessary distinction between it and its social uses as a motiva-
tion, emblem and an emotional mobilizing factor in conflict situa-
tions, as a form of secondary and arbitrary sacralization of various as-
sociations and human activities. In such cases the external and formal
marks of the religious, such as affiliation, delimitation from others,
identification with a territory and community, are put to functional
use; the contents of religion that once determined its origin, such as
adhering to a certain ethos and observing a specific moral code (par-
ticularly characteristic of Christianity) remain in the background.
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Both on the individual and social plan, the orientation of the
transcending, universalizing power of religion could vary depending
on the macro-social movements a community (respectively, an indi-
vidual) is involved. For the individual as for the community, religion
could be a cultural position transcending ego- and ethno-centrism,
mono-cultural tendencies – at the initial stage of development of
world religions, in the historical periods of formation of macro-so-
cial, cross-cultural entities. In situations of internal differentiation
and disintegration of these entities, the universalizing, binding role
of religion is partialized and determined by various social groups,
who are often in opposition to each other due to their economic, po-
litical, ethnic, psychological features. Being an idea, rituality, feel-
ing that internally integrates the group, partialized religion (respec-
tively modified in dogmatic and institutional terms) becomes a
spiritual force that often counters the other, the alien, supporting the
practices of the confrontation.
This process is usually related to the invalidation of univer-
sally uniting religious-moral bonds and values and intensification of
differences: power, property, doctrinal differences; to a shift of the
weight center from internal spiritual movements (particularly typical
of mysticism, asceticism, priesthood) on to practical social action –
reformist heresies, the various practical theologies of revolution, lib-
eration, the religious-motivated wars.
Despite the fact that, following its abstract definition, religion
could be defined as a universal phenomenon, in reality it remains
closely connected with the various forms of human communal
co-existence – the family, the tribe, the state, the empire, the civiliza-
tion. The universal religious community which connects the Chris-
tians (Ecclesia), or the Muslims (Umma) remains an imaginary con-
cept, or, rather, a spiritual construct normally deprived of any social
and normative validity. This contradiction between the universalist-
ic spirit and doctrine of these world religions and their local connec-
tion with concrete human communities, according to certain authors,
proves fatal for the cultural status of religion, making it a victim of
rivalry and aggression. Considering another point of view, each par-
ticular type of religion and the religious controversies, draw the di-
viding line between the separate human communities – groups, na-
tions, types of ethnicity, civilizations.
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These theoretical problems have been widely discussed both
in terms of the philosophy and sociology of religion. Since the En-
lightenment onwards, together with the decreased influence of the
religion and of the Church, there has been a clear tendency for reli-
gion to be interpreted as a part of the structure and functions of the
social system: as its organic element or a subsystem (Weber, Durk-
heim), as subordinated to the moral sphere (Kant), as a sub-stage in
the self-evolution of the Absolute Mind (Hegel), as a form of indi-
vidual and social alienation (Foyerbach, Marx), as a “ton” of the so-
cial communication (Simmel), etc.
2. Religion and the social context
The qualitative changes that have taken effect on Christianity
as a faith and institution, both in the West and East, during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century have shown that the Christianity has be-
come more dependent on and reactionary connected to the funda-
mental cultural specificity of the particular society in which it exists.
Socio-cultural peculiarities of that society such as: the degree of
evolution of the individual element, rationality and openness of the
institutions and social relations, and the types of political and social
system, are the factors which the role of religion in society and its
doctrinal and institutional transformations depend upon.
As a researcher has put it, the most prominent topic through-
out the above discussed deals with the different uses of the absolute
religious definitions, which the whole humankind should be able to
access (God, eternity, divinity), and their subordination to various
private or temporary aims and communities. The embodied Abso-
lute acquires historical, geographical and communal forms and defi-
nitions. Thus it has turned from a unifying into a dividing force.
The differentiation of monotheistic religions, particularly of
Islam and Christianity (with its confessional divisions into Catholi-
cism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy) is a process in which the
absolute is linked with relative determinations: with concrete com-
munities, territories, cultures. This tendency has at least two very
important consequences: 1) the erosion of the image of God as an ab-
solute, as a transcendent reality; the striving of each religion to re-
vive his sacral status through a specific form of universalization, a
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particular monopoly on him, and 2) the inclusion of religious faith
and experience in the complex social texture of needs, passions,
community identities pertaining to particular empires, states, na-
tions, ethnic groups, civilizations, classes.
The divided God has lost his sacral, absolute immunity and is
drawn into involvement as a collaborator and participant in various
human enterprises, strivings, yearnings. I see this tendency as re-
flecting the essence of the much debated process (notion) of secular-
ization. Understood in this way, secularization is a tendency evident
even in Islamic countries, where religion is increasingly connected
with political, national, social projects and interests.
When reduced to an ethnic, political, or state emblem, reli-
gious affiliation to Judaism, Islam, Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protes-
tantism have become and still are tools for the sacralization of mili-
tary and political conflicts. In religion-motivated conflict situations,
opposing parties de-sacralize their Sacred Books as their acts contra-
dict the books’ moral content.
The ethos of major religions, presented in their Sacred Books
(particularly in Christianity and Islam) is mostly linked to ideas and
recommendations that support humility, patience, non-resistance,
love for one’s fellow men, especially the weak and poor. The Bible
promotes love for one’s fellow men, one’s enemies included, as a su-
preme Christian value (Apostle Paul). In the Koran, the poor, weak
and suffering enjoy particular care and respect. At the same time, it is
repeatedly pointed out that national, ethnic and sex differences can-
not be a ground for division and opposition wherever people are
united by the same creed – Christian or Muslim. Of course, this does
not mean that Sacred Texts do not contain other accents that render
absolute the rightness of one’s own faith, drawing a line of division
between virtuous and sinful, expecting the latter to be punished, etc.
But the first line – that of humility and patience – is stronger and
brighter, and it determines the emphases in the moral consciousness
of the religions in question. The issue of punishment and violence is
left at the disposal of the supreme force and is usually expected be-
yond earthly time and history.
For early Christianity the moral commitment was of para-
mount importance. The specific features of the Christian ethos then
was acceptance of suffering, non-resistance to evil, resignation,
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humility, leaving it to God to mete justice, etc., all of which are in-
compatible with violence over others. In modern times the cultural
area of this type of morality has been severely reduced. The cult of
human activeness, the implementation of control mechanisms and
regulations in all spheres of activity, the emphasis on the present, are
all modern values which have gradually turned Christian morality
into a marginal, rarely encountered phenomenon. I feel that this is
largely true for all modernizing countries regardless of the religions
prevailing in them. Thus the type of Christian morality is rather a
question of personal character and choice than a matter of social cul-
ture. This type of morality is not amenable to group regulation and
mobilization, for it implies both a certain type of behaviour and a cor-
responding motivation and feeling. This personal spiritual commit-
ment of the doer is lacking in the completely regulated culture of
modern times.
Religion becomes a vital element of a national, ethnic, in gen-
eral, group, community ideology only when it becomes immediately
tied and subordinated to the cultural, political, etc. reproduction of
the respective community. When it is absorbed into group mythol-
ogy. One of its essential functions in the process of its instrumental-
ization is to provide the basis for the ontological status of the group,
for its right on autonomous existence on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, for its superiority, its authority over and above other
communities of its kind . This usage of religion is particularly inten-
sive when the group inhabits an environment with a different reli-
gious affiliation. When, due to whatever historical circumstances,
this environment has been for a long time or has become hostile to
the existence and preservation of the group the religious differences
of the conflicting parties become a durable element of their aggres-
sive and defensive strategies.
Mechanisms of instrumentalization are usually connected
with:
1) Adoctrinal reductionism with respect to the particular reli-
gion. Group mythology eliminates the universalist, general human
appeal of religion (each historical religion contains such an appeal)
and ties it above all to its own origin and heroic past; it sacralizes its
own territory and temporal continuity drawing from it energies for
its future.
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2) A second characteristic mechanism for the instrumental-
ization of religion as a foundation of group identity is the shift of ac-
cent from its moral and spiritual value for the individual to its
group-symbolic functions.
3) A third main mechanism of group instrumentalization of
religion is activist mobilisation, transformation of religious doctrine.
Aggressive strategy of the group is often connected with it. In histor-
ical religions patience, non-resistance, spiritual surpassing of suffer-
ing is in the focus of attention. Privatised by an ethnos, a nation or
other kind of group, religion is grounding an activist manifestation
of the group.
3. Notes on history and the historical background of the myth
of “God’s elect” nation
The belief that every community has it own divinity (its totem
in the terms of archaic religion), which protects, shields and unites it,
is an inseparable element of the religious complex of all ancient
tribal religions. The function of the bond between the community
and its specific divinity is related to: 1) establishing and sacralizing
the boundaries of the respective territory and the social unit; 2) sym-
bolizing, objectifying tribal unity and identity; 3) distinguishing the
community as a specific, autonomous group from neighbouring
groups that compete for territory and resources; 4) inspiring a feeling
of security and protection against the natural elements and dangers
of the environment; 5) bestowing sacred status on the leader as a
center and personification of these functions.
An important moment in the cultural evolution of the idea of
the sacred bond between the group and the divinity is the emergence
of the great historical religions and the Biblical idea of God’s elect
people, Israel. Set down as part of the holy book of Christendom, this
idea still forms an explosive synthesis of political ideology and mili-
tary force (as evident in the Near East conflict).
As an element of the Bible, the idea of God’s elect nation and
the nation’s God-chosen leader (almost a god himself) goes beyond
the initial national, local connotations and gradually accumulates a
universalistic potential, serving as an ideal core, a universal matrix
which fuels with idealistic and emotional energy the national my-
thologies of separate peoples converted to Christianity. But this con-
cept sets cultural grounds or rather produces a pretext for interna-
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tional rivalry over the “private ownership” of the Christian God. In
the Middle Ages a large part of the international relations in the Bal-
kans, (wars, diplomatic maneuvers, political rivalry) developed un-
der the banner of this “nationalization”, this “privatization” of divine
protection and preference. Of course, this was not the only nor the
basic function of Christianity in this period and in this region. The
lofty moral, cultural, spiritual dimensions, the humane potential of
this religion are well known. The possibility for Christianity to as-
sume the status of a national, state, and imperial political religion de-
rive from the ambivalence in its ideal contents and the varying social
“physical condition” (G. Simmel) that it is exists in. This social con-
dition may be one of two basic kinds: 1) a type of morality related to
interpersonal relationships and the sacralizing values of humility,
patience, love, which surmount the boundaries, languages, and cul-
tures that divide people (St. Paul); 2) as a social (state, ethnic, na-
tional) ideology and mythology that sanctifies community identity –
community borderlines, history, language, culture – and the unique
mission of the community; in this community mythology, based on
the religious idea of what is “ours”, the boundaries of “ours” are usu-
ally clearly defined, so that “ours” is perceived as superior and op-
posed to the others, to the alien.
Such a process can be observed in the histories of all Balkan
nations converted to Christianity. I should make a preliminary speci-
fication: the instrumental use of Christianity in its “physical condi-
tion” of a political religion and an ideal core of political mythology, is
not based only on the ideological ambivalence of the ideas contained
in this religion. The determining factor lies elsewhere: it consists in
the various national and historical needs of states, empires, ethnic
groups to sanctify, to find a transcendent foundation for offensive or
defensive forms of furthering their separate interests in the struggle to
impose or protect their “own” against the “alien”. Our “own” may as-
sume different forms according to the shape or pretensions of the
alien; it could be perceived in terms of territory, material resources, or
mythological symbolism, of the “true faith”, or other attributes of col-
lective identity. The myth of God’s elect, personified by the divinely
chosen leader, provides sacred foundations and powerful emotional
energy for defending or proving the superiority of one’s own commu-
nity, a process that usually demands bloody sacrifices.
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4. Repetition and modernization of the
“Religion-national mythology” synthesis
The power of historical mythologies is in reverse proportion
to the capacity of a nation to periodically renew its social life world –
its psychological attitudes, labour relations, political stereotypes; in
A. Toynbee’s words, this is the capacity to respond to external and
internal challenges by using a nation’s inner resources, and not by
warring with near and distant nations. I will apply Toynbee’s ideas to
make one other argument. The political elite bears a particularly
great responsibility for maintaining the typical inertia of mythologi-
cal archetypes in the collective consciousness. In the modern history
of the countries in the Balkan region the national elites have, with
few exceptions, followed rather than critically overcome these ste-
reotypes. Moreover, in the post-totalitarian period, using the capac-
ity of modern propaganda, most of these elites have stirred up and
enervated these stereotypes, bringing them to dangerous extremes.
The reverses of fortune in the political destinies of nations
have been dramatic in these regions: Ottoman domination destroyed
the official statehood and official cultural spheres of the peoples; the
opening of the countries to various spiritual, economic, ideological
influences after the creation in the 19th century of the national states
in the Balkans; the creation of the Yugoslav Federation (1918), and of
the “Socialist bloc” in the 1940s, etc. In parallel with these transfor-
mations, the myth of a unifying and dominant political and spiritual
center that would transcend and envelop the separate states (which is
the prototype of the “God’s elect” myth) continues to exist although
with a new ideological content. Together with the idea of an Ortho-
dox religious community (gradually laid aside in modern times), this
alliance, this federation of countries is increasingly seeking grounds
in the Slavic ethnic element or rather with compact parts of this ele-
ment, i.e. the Southern Slavs and the Eastern Slavs. The core of the
myth – the religious belief in “God’s elect” – has been replaced by a
Slavic ethnocentric idea. This modernization of the mythological ma-
trix is based on the higher capacity for unification that the ethnic con-
cept offers in modern times. The ethnic idea justifies the greater inte-
grating vocation of the central state, which has assumed the mission
of unifier on the basis of this idea; the state is thus justified in forming
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a contemporary oikoumenos, a commonwealth of neighbouring
countries that differ in language and religion, but live in similar so-
cial-economic conditions. The communist idea, which is placed at
the core of the myth of a nation with a unique historical mission (in
this case Soviet Russia) transcends the religious and ethnic bound-
aries of the nations it unites, and justifies the inclusion into the “com-
monwealth” of a variety of nations and cultures.
It is quite clear and widely accepted that in modern Balkan
history the myth of the unique mission of state and nation, for the
monopoly of which Balkan states still compete, is increasingly be-
coming a tool for the realization of the separate interests of the rival
states, including territorial, economic and national-identity interests.
The mythological archetype of the state and national mission is in-
creasingly becoming the object of political manipulation. The politi-
cal elite uses its mobilizing capacity in ways that seem to best suit
the occasion. In most cases (in keeping with the inertia of the initial
archetype), the myth is used for offense or defense, for imposing or
protecting “one’s own”. More rarely it is used for internal cultural
and economic development and growth that will free the respective
country of fear of aggressive intentions. The mythological form has
the capacity of unifying masses and elite (especially the people and
its leader), of turning them into a united emotional community. In
this union of people and leader, a mystic alliance prevails through
the revived collective memories, through passions, impulses, irratio-
nal thinking and behaviour. Legitimacy, contract relations, ratio-
nal-pragmatic and clearly formulated responsibilities and expecta-
tions are replaced by piety, by power charisma (M. Weber).
5. Ambivalence and vitality of the mythological form:
causes and consequences
We hardly need to prove the strong motivating force of such a
synthesis, which recurs even in post-modern times and not only in
the Balkans. I should specify that the myth of “God’s elect”, of the
nation’s mission, and historical mythology in general have an am-
bivalent cultural potential. Which particular possibility will be mate-
rialized, whether the myth will be used as a source of energy for pos-
itive internal development of the state or for aggression and military
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action abroad, will entirely depend on the political maturity and cul-
ture of the respective nation and particularly on its political and in-
tellectual elite. That is why I believe the term used by the Bulgarian
historian M. Lalkov is particularly suitable – he refers to a useful his-
tory and mythology, meaning a kind of usage of historical mytholog-
ical material that depends not only on traditions but on a people’s vi-
tal force for construction and renewal.
The dangerous form of use of historical myths and particu-
larly of the myth of uniqueness, of an important mission (linguistic,
religious, ethnic) in modern and recent history of most Balkan na-
tions is one of the ideological causes for the military and cultural ri-
valry between them. The actual cultural-historical causes for this are
a result of the limited resources, of the complex interweaving and
small differences with regard to language, religion, ethnic back-
ground between the peoples and states in this region; these facts
have been discussed by many authors. Nevertheless, all these causes
are centered around the as yet incomplete individualities of these
states, in their insufficient self-confidence and awareness of how
states can function effectively in our times. National identities are
still upheld through pre-modern forms of group affiliation, formed in
the past and fixed in tradition. The past, national belonging, origin,
tradition, territory are all key terms of pre-modern historical frame-
works that limit action and personal fulfilment. In cultures where
these factors predominate, the past prevails over the present; tradi-
tion, over renewal; affiliation, over free self-expression; memories,
over productive action; destruction, over constructiveness. In these
types of states and cultures the unique mission and significance is
not a result of the united productive energies of autonomous individ-
uals but of collective historical memories and passions, which are
not capable of sweeping away all attempts at independent thinking
and behaviour.
The supporting structure of this type of domination of collec-
tive memory or mythology over individual reflection and action is
specific to Balkan societies and culture: it consists in the collectivist
fabric of these societies and the weakness of autonomous individual-
ism, a situation that emerging Western capitalism overcame centu-
ries ago. These collectivist forms and attitudes were additionally
fixed during the time of totalitarianism. Of course, this is not to say
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that this kind of mentality and social behaviour is typical for all peri-
ods and all countries of the Balkans to an equal degree. Moreover,
these defense mechanisms of identity and the idea of a national mis-
sion have been and still are practiced at times in certain places even
in Western countries. The myth of a God-chosen center with a
unique universalistic mission, in its secular form, has also been used
in the 20th century in developed Western states and is currently being
used by the US. The consequences of this modern usage of the ar-
chaic myth are far more important and, in some cases, destructive
than so-called “Balkanization”.
Such situations are not an exclusive regional characteristic of
Balkan societies, of the Balkan national character. They exist actu-
ally or potentially among quite a few peoples, cultures, including
highly developed ones in respect to economy and technology. What
then are the local causes for actualizing this common potential, for
activating the historical myth of the mission of an exceptional com-
munity (even in its outdated form) as a means for defense and ag-
gression against foreigners? One of the most important ones is the
domination of collectivist attitudes, which narrow down the field of
innovational self-expression of individuals in relations of creative
work, politics, and in interpersonal relationships. These attitudes
seem to be a particularly strong obstacle in cases when the old forms
and relationships have exhausted their potential, while the emer-
gence of new forms requires a life space, a Lebensraum for inde-
pendent, courageous, free individuals; when such individuals fail to
produce the creative force of new social forms, the latter become the
product of the collectivist forces.
In fact totalitarianism, fascism, dictatorship are a specific
“creation” of collectivist forces personified and then manipulated by
the so-called elite (Arendt, etc.). This lack of free space for self-ful-
filment (not in terms of territory but as a social characteristic of the
community) of individual creative energy is the deep cause of the
crisis. This unconscious or conscious thwarting of the nation’s cre-
ative energy creates a general feeling of crisis, of breakdown, of de-
struction, not of construction of a living world. As philosophers of
history say, society then enters a period of changes, a situation in
which various options are possible. The activation of historical my-
thology and especially of the myth of the nation’s mission, its
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exceptionality and divine election, are a sure sign of the collectiv-
ist-traditional form of compensating for thwarted social growth. The
presence of myth shows that society has chosen the well-used past
means of defense and aggression, of opposition between “ours” and
“other’s” , of charismatic submission to power and to the “leader”.
Society has thereby chosen to look upon Lebensraum as a cleansing
of all elements that are not part of God’s elect people. This
Lebensraum has archaic connotations: territory, language, religion,
mythology. The process can be stopped and reoriented only by a po-
litical elite that well knows the power of the trend, but finds it dan-
gerous rather than useful and has understanding and vision with re-
gard to a modern national strategy. Unfortunately, during most of
their history most Balkan peoples have not succeeded in producing
such an elite. The causes for this failure are various and have been
sufficiently studied. In the rest of the world as well, it is rare for the
elite to surpass the political maturity of its people. There is usually
some degree of correspondence, as Plato remarked.
In the present-day situation in the Balkans, we observed that the
elite regards collectivist attitudes and historical mythologies as a use-
ful opportunity, as a source of power, as a cultural tool devised by an-
cestors and ready for usewhen polished and sharpened by propaganda.
The historical myth of superiority, of divine election, and the
mission of “our community” throws a “sacred canopy” (P. Berger’s
term) over tradition, religion, morals. It is not the myth that brings
forth the elemental energy of the people, but the energy that exploits
the myth. And this is true, whether the myth of the mission be re-
vived by poetry and historical romanticism or by metaphysical phi-
losophers, by refined theologians or by mediums. In this type of situ-
ation, religion is usually reduced to “belonging”, as G.Davie put it, (a
striking symbol of difference and alien nature – ethnic, linguistic,
psychological), at the expense of “believing” and a corresponding
moral behavior. The religious universe becomes thus subordinated
to partial group values, instead of standing above them.
*
It was probably in consideration of this wide range of “faces”
of religious phenomenon, of the understanding of the very concept
of religion, that the German philosopher and sociologist Georg
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Simmel (1858–1918) wrote: “The sources and essence of religion
are concealed in a deceitful semi-obscurity. Things do not become
any clearer, if, as earlier, no more than a single problem is perceived
here, requiring a single solution. Today, no one has succeeded in pro-
posing a definition of religion that be not vague and imprecise, yet
that encompass all the phenomena and tell us what religion is… reli-
gion is not clearly distinguished, on the one hand, frommetaphysical
speculation and, on the other, from faith in providence… The indefi-
nite essence of religion corresponds to the multiple psychological
motives that are recognized to be its sources”.
Nonka Bogomilova
FILOZOFSKI PRISTUP SINTEZI
„RELIGIJA – NACIONALNA MITOLOGIJA“
Rezime
Ovaj tekst analizira filozofske aspekte sinteze „religija – nacionalna ideolo-
gija“. Sledeæi su glavni pravci studije: 1. I na individualnom i na društvenom planu,
usmerenje na transcendiranju, univerzalizaciji moæi religije moe varirati u zavisno-
sti od makrosocijalnih kretanja zajednice (ili pojedinca) koji je u njih ukljuèen. Kako
za pojedinca tako i za zajednicu, religija bi mogla biti kulturno stanovište koje trans-
cendira egocentrizam i etnocentrizam, kao i monokulturna kretanja; u situacijama
unutrašnjih raslojavanja i dezintegracije tih entiteta, univerzalizujuæa uloga religije
je parcijalizovana i odreðena od razlièitih društvenih grupa koje èesto stoje nasuprot
jedna drugoj zbog njihovih politièkih, ekonomskih, etnièkih i psiholoških osobina. 2.
Taj je proces obièno povezan s obezvreðivanjem univerzalno ujedinjujuæih reli-
gijsko-moralnih vrednosti i intenziviranjem razlika: moæ, svojina, doktrinalne razli-
ke; 3. Kada su svedeni na etnièke, politièke ili dravne simbole, religiozna pripadnost
judaizmu, islamu, pravoslavlju, katolièanstvu, protestantizmu postaje i ostaje sred-
stvo za sakralizaciju vojnih i politièkih sukoba. U situacijama sukoba koji religijski
motivisani, protivnièke strane desakralizuju svete knjige druge strane kako njihova
dela protivreèe moralnom sadraju tih knjiga. 4. Moæ istorijskih mitologija je u
obrnutoj srazmeri sa sposobnošæu nacije da periodièno obnovi svoj društveni svet
ivota – svoja psihološka dranja, radne odnose, politièke stereotipe. 5. U situaciji
tog tipa, religija je obièno svedena na „pripadništvo“, kako na to ukazuje G. Dejvi,
nauštrb „verovanja“ i odgovarajuæeg moralnog ponašanja.
Kljuène reèi: religija, nacija, mitologija, instrumentalizacija, misija.
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